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BAD MEDICINE: FTC v. ACTAVIS, INC. AND THE MISSED 
OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE PAY-FOR-DELAY PROBLEM 
SUSAN SCHIPPER∗ 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court of 
the United States considered whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit correctly dismissed the Federal Trade Commission’s 
(“FTC”) antitrust challenge to a reverse payment settlement agreement2 be-
tween brand-name and generic drug manufacturers,3 in the context of patent 
litigation, for the hormone medication AndroGel.4  This type of settlement 
is colloquially referred to as a “pay-for-delay” arrangement.5  The Court 
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 1.  133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  
 2.  Id. at 2227.  Briefly, a reverse payment settlement is a settlement wherein a brand-name 
drug company pays a potentially competitive generic drug company to defer putting its approved 
generic version of the brand-name’s drug on the market for a certain period of time.  See infra 
Parts I and II.A (elaborating upon the concept and details of reverse payment settlements).  This 
agreement takes place within litigation where the brand-name, as the plaintiff, sues the generic for 
infringement on the brand-name’s patented drug.  Id.  The reverse payment settlement is so called 
because a plaintiff paying a defendant in settlement is the reverse of a typical litigation outcome.  
Id. 
 3.  Companies that test, produce, and obtain patents for new drugs or drug composites that 
are filed and sold under a trade name, such as Tylenol, are known as brand-name companies.  
Companies that obtain a patent to market generic, bioequivalent versions of brand-name drugs 
under the name of the active ingredient(s) of the drug, or under a different name than the brand-
name, are known as generic companies.  See What are Generic Drugs?, FDA.GOV (May 12, 
2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understan
dingGenericDrugs/ucm144456.htm; see also, e.g., List of Marketed Acetaminophen-Containing 
Prescription Products, FDA.GOV  (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/informationbydrugclass/ucm239821.htm#list (listing in a 
chart the “brand name” and “generic name” of certain types of prescription medications contain-
ing acetaminophen).  This Note will hereinafter refer to brand-name drug companies as either 
“brand-names” or “brand-name companies,” and will refer to generic drug companies as “gener-
ics” or “generic companies.”   
 4.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229–30; FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th 
Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 5.  See, e.g., Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1301 (“This case involves a type of patent 
litigation settlement known as a ‘pay for delay’ or ‘reverse payment’ agreement.”); Ark. Carpen-
ters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In the industry par-
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held that the Eleventh Circuit erred in failing to allow the FTC to challenge 
the legality of the settlement, where a brand-name pharmaceutical compa-
ny, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, agreed to pay the named generic, Actavis, Inc., 
and other generic drug companies, hundreds of millions of dollars to refrain 
from marketing a generic version of AndroGel until 2015.6  The FTC al-
leged in its complaint against the settling drug companies that the reverse 
payment component of their settlement was a collusive, horizontal restraint 
on trade and was therefore a violation of antitrust law.7  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit dismissed the FTC’s challenge and held that the monopoly powers con-
ferred to pharmaceutical patent-holders precluded the FTC from bringing an 
antitrust action against the parties engaging in pay-for-delay as long as the 
anti-competitive effects of the pay-for-delay do not exceed the scope of the 
patent’s monopoly.8  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding instead that 
reverse payment settlements are not impervious to antitrust challenges and 
can be decided using a traditional antitrust framework.9 
The Court was correct in holding that antitrust challenges to pay-for-
delay arrangements are indeed justiciable and that questions surrounding 
the legality of the settlements should be decided against an antitrust frame-
work.10  Ultimately, though, the Court failed to embrace one of the compet-
ing standards that lower federal courts have used when applying antitrust 
principles to reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical context.11  
The Court should have adopted the rigorous “quick look rule of reason” 
analysis as the definitive standard for adjudging reverse payment agree-
ments.12  As a matter of policy, the Court should have also recommended 
that reverse payment settlements be subject to judicial approval to ensure 
that they do not exceed the anticipated costs of litigation.13  This recom-
mendation would likely limit the number of patent challenges that are set-
tled using a reverse payment model, thereby decreasing the risk of antitrust 
violations.14  Further, it would strike a balance between allowing early mar-
                                                          
lance, [a reverse payment settlement] is called a ‘reverse exclusion payment,’ or, more evocative-
ly, a ‘pay-for-delay settlement.’”).  This Note will hereinafter refer to reverse payment settlements 
either as “reverse payment settlements” or “pay-for-delay arrangements.”   
 6.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2229.  
 7.  Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1305.  
 8.  Id. at 1312.  
 9.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2237–38.  
 10.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 11.  See infra Parts II.B and IV.B.1.   
 12.  See infra Part IV.B.2.   
 13.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 14.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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ket entry for generic companies while ensuring that brand-name companies 
continue to receive the patent protections afforded to them.15 
I.  THE CASE 
Belgian pharmaceutical company Besins Healthcare, S.A. (“Besins”) 
developed a formula for a prescription gel used to treat male hypogonad-
ism, a condition where the body does not produce normal levels of testos-
terone; the company called this new drug “AndroGel.”16  In August 1995, 
Besins entered into an agreement with another brand-name drug manufac-
turer, Solvay Pharmaceuticals (“Solvay”), to supply Solvay with AndroGel 
once Solvay received government approval to sell the drug in the United 
States.17  In 1999, Solvay filed a New Drug Application (“NDA”)18 with the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to market AndroGel, which the 
FDA approved in 2000.19  Solvay subsequently obtained a relevant patent 
from the Patent and Trademark Office to sell AndroGel in 2003, and dis-
closed its patent to the FDA.20  Solvay’s patent for AndroGel, Patent Num-
ber 6,503,894 (“#894 patent”), expires in 2020.21  According to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, a main governing body of law for the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry, the FDA must grant a drug manufacturer three years of drug ex-
clusivity for a new drug application containing an active ingredient that has 
already been approved by the FDA, but which still includes important clini-
cal investigations.22  The FDA is only authorized to approve generic ver-
sions of a brand-name drug once the brand-name’s exclusivity period is 
over.23  Since Solvay’s NDA contained crucial clinical investigations re-
garding the active ingredients in AndroGel, the FDA granted the company 
exclusivity for the drug for three years.24  AndroGel is a profitable drug; be-
tween 2000 and 2007, U.S. sales of AndroGel totaled more than $1.8 bil-
lion.25 
                                                          
 15.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 16.  In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1372–73 (N.D. Ga. 2010).  
 17.  Id. at 1373.   
 18.  Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(b) (2012) (explaining the Hatch-Waxman Act’s requirements 
and process for a New Drug Application); see also infra Part II.A (elaborating on the NDA re-
quirements).  
 19.  In re Androgel, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1373. 
 20.  Id.; see infra Part II.A (explaining the requirements and process for filing an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application). 
 21.  FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1304 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Ac-
tavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  
 22.  21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  In re Androgel, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.   
 25.  Id.   
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While brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers must undertake ex-
tensive drug testing before their NDAs can be approved, manufacturers ap-
plying to market generic versions of already-existing drugs do not need to 
file rigorous NDAs, and instead can file less costly and time-consuming ap-
plications called Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDAs”).26  With-
in their ANDAs, generics assert that the version of the drug they seek to 
market is the biological equivalent of an already-FDA-approved medica-
tion.27  It is also incumbent on generic manufacturers to certify that their 
generic drug, despite its bioequivalency, will not infringe on the brand-
name’s patent for the drug.28  In late 2003, Actavis, Inc. (formerly named 
Watson Pharmaceuticals29 and referred to hereinafter as “Actavis”), a ge-
neric drug manufacturer, filed an ANDA with the FDA to market a generic 
version of AndroGel.30  In its application, Actavis certified that despite its 
bioequivalency to AndroGel, its generic version of the drug would not in-
fringe on Solvay’s patent because Solvay’s patent was overly broad and 
thereby invalid.31  Following Actavis’s ANDA submission, another generic 
manufacturer, Paddock Laboratories, Inc. (“Paddock”), also filed an ANDA 
to market a generic version of AndroGel.32  Consequently, Solvay filed a 
patent infringement suit against both Actavis and Paddock.33  Solvay’s in-
fringement action triggered the requisite thirty-month waiting period before 
the FDA could approve Actavis’s application.34 
From 2003 to 2005, Solvay, Actavis, and Paddock engaged in litiga-
tion regarding the #894 AndroGel patent; following discovery, the generics 
filed motions for summary judgment on the patent’s (in)validity.35  The mo-
tions were “fully briefed and ready for decision” in January 2006 when the 
                                                          
 26.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j); see infra Part II.A (discussing the ANDA process stipulated by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act).  An ANDA is a speedier route for patent approval available to generic drug 
manufacturers, allowing them to apply for market approval from the FDA for a new, generic ver-
sion of an already existing drug without conducting extensive testing when a brand-name manu-
facturer has already gone through the testing and received FDA approval to market its biologically 
similar medicine.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).   
 27.  FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1302 (2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(a) 
(2012)), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).   
 28.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vi). 
 29.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (“Actavis, Inc. (then known as Watson Pharmaceuticals), filed 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application for a generic drug modeled after AndroGel.”).  
 30.  Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d at 1304.   
 31.  Id.   
 32.  Id.  Notably, as the second generic to file an ANDA, Paddock could not enjoy the same 
180-day period of exclusivity that Actavis would receive as the first filer.  Id.   
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.; see also infra Part II.A.  Hatch-Waxman requires the FDA to wait thirty months be-
fore approving an ANDA when the generic filing the ANDA is involved in paragraph IV litiga-
tion.  21 U.S.C. §§ 355 (j)(5)(A)–(B) (2012).  
 35.  Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1304.   
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FDA approved Actavis’s ANDA to market its generic version of Andro-
Gel.36  Recognizing that it would lose its exclusivity to market AndroGel if 
the court granted the generics’ summary judgment motion, which could 
lead to a subsequent reduction of $125 million per year in profit, Solvay of-
fered Actavis a hefty settlement.37  As part of the settlement, Actavis agreed 
to delay the entry of its generic into the market until August 2015; other ge-
neric manufacturers, including Paddock, made similar deals with Solvay.38  
In exchange for their delayed entry, Solvay agreed to give Actavis between 
$19 and $30 million of its AndroGel profits per year until September 2015, 
and to pay Paddock $10 million per year for six years.39 
Solvay asserted that its proposed payments were compensation for 
“other services” that the generics agreed to perform, but the FTC countered 
that the payments were made to compensate the generics for agreeing not to 
compete against AndroGel until 2015.40  The FTC filed suit in 2010 against 
all of the settling parties—Solvay, Actavis, Paddock, and another generic 
manufacturer, Par Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc.—in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.41  The FTC’s complaint asserted 
that the respondents violated several federal antitrust laws by unlawfully 
agreeing to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent chal-
lenges, and refrain from launching their low-cost generic products to com-
pete with AndroGel for nine years.42 
The district court dismissed the case, holding that the FTC’s allega-
tions dealt in the patent arena, and thus did not properly invoke antitrust 
law.43  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion, reasoning that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, 
a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its 
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent.”44  Although the appellate court acknowledged that antitrust vio-
lations often occur when one company pays another company to stay out of 
a particular market, the court also noted that reverse payment settlements of 
patent litigation present “atypical cases” because patent holders have an in-
herent legal right to exclude others from the market.45  By its very nature, 
                                                          
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 1304–05.   
 38.  Id. at 1305.   
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.   
 41.  In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375–76 (N.D. Ga. 2010).  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 1380.  
 44.  Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312.  
 45.  Id. at 1307.  
SchipperFinalAuthorReview 5/6/2014  12:34 PM 
2014] FTC v. ACTAVIS, INC. 1245 
the court reasoned, “a patent conveys the right to ‘cripple competition.’”46  
Citing the need to resolve the competing standards used by different federal 
courts in adjudging antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, the 
Supreme Court granted the FTC’s petition for certiorari.47 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
and its 2003 amendments,48 commonly and collectively known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act (“Hatch-Waxman” or “the Act”), regulates patent ap-
plication and market approval for both brand-name and generic drug com-
panies,49 but contains no provision that specifically governs the applicabil-
ity of antitrust law to patent litigation.50  As such, for over ten years before 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., antitrust-
reverse payment settlement disputes had been subject to various standards 
and levels of scrutiny in several different federal circuits.51  Reverse pay-
ment settlement jurisprudence was therefore largely unpredictable: federal 
courts identified the same stubborn legal issues inherent in charging a pa-
tent-related action—which is essentially a government-sanctioned monopo-
ly—with violating government-established anti-monopoly principles, but 
came to different conclusions to resolve the tension and followed no over-
arching formula.52 
Part II.A of this Note explores the relevant provisions of Hatch-
Waxman that govern the patent filing process for both brand-name and ge-
neric drug companies and outlines the course of events within these filings 
that lead to paragraph IV litigation.53  Part II.B highlights the three dispar-
ate standards that federal courts have used in resolving reverse payment set-
tlement challenges in the context of pharmaceutical litigation. 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 1309 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 
2005)).   
 47.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).   
 48.  21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).  
 49.  21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (j)(2)(A)(vii); see also infra Part II.A.  
 50.  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (“[D]ifferent courts have reached different conclusions 
about the application of the antitrust laws to Hatch-Waxman-related patent settlements.”).  
 51.  See infra Part II.C (discussing how the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, 
Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have used different standards to resolve antitrust challenges 
to pay-for-delay arrangements).  
 52.  See infra Part II.C (discussing competing interests that several circuits have weighed 
when considering antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, such as the interest in pre-
serving judicial preferences for settlement and the interest in ensuring that a settlement provision 
does not go beyond the scope of a patent-holder’s rightly held monopoly on a particular drug).  
 53.  See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Filing Requirements for Both Brand-Name and Generic 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Mandated by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act Provide a Mechanism for Paragraph IV Litigation and Reverse 
Payment Settlements 
The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to reframe drug patent ap-
proval laws in the United States to allow generic equivalents of patented 
brand-name drugs to gain expedited market approval and lower drug prices 
for consumers, while still providing adequate patent protections and incen-
tives for brand-name manufacturers to continue to develop new drugs.54  
Prior to the passage of the Act, there was a large gap between the time that 
a patent expired on a brand-name drug and the time that a generic manufac-
turer was eligible to market its own version of the drug.55  This delay en-
sued largely because, prior to the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, generic 
manufacturers were required to conduct full testing to prove the safety and 
efficacy of their drugs (even if the drugs were exact copies of a brand-
name’s drug), and they were not allowed to use the brand-name’s data or 
drug as a template for their own testing.56  With this required expensive 
testing,57 it took generic manufacturers approximately three years after 
brand-name patent expiration to bring their generic drugs to market.58  In 
                                                          
 54.  See 130 CONG. REC. 24,430 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman) 
(“The public will benefit twice; by the further incentive for research and development for new, 
innovative drugs and by the immediate reduction in drug prices when a generic is on the market as 
a competitor.”); see also Ian Jaquette, Comment, Merck KGAA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd.: 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision for the People Who Matter Most . . . the Consumer, 
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 101–02 (2007) (“Title I of the Act created an abbreviated new drug appli-
cation process designed to expedite the arrival of generic drugs . . . .  Congress enacted Title II of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act as a means of mitigating the distortion to the [brand-name’s] patent 
term.”).  
 55.  H. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984).  
 56.  Id.; see also Jeff Thomas, Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse Pay-
ments in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 18 (2007) (“Prior to passage of 
the [Hatch-Waxman Act] Amendments [to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act], generic manufac-
turers were required to wait for the branded drug patent to expire before beginning development 
work on the patented product.”); Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 171, 174–75 (2008) (“Generic manufacturers could not use the NDA holder’s data to demon-
strate safety and efficacy, and were forced to conduct their own clinical trials.”).  
 57.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (finding 
that the development of new drugs take, on average, ten to fifteen years); see also Bret Dickey, 
Jonathan Orszag & Laura Tyson, An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharma-
ceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 369 (2010) (estimating that a new drug takes ten to 
fifteen years to develop and costs more than $1.3 billion). 
 58.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 38 (1998) [hereinafter 
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS], available at 
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contrast, since Hatch-Waxman’s enactment and the creation of the ANDA 
system, the typical timespan between brand-name patent expiration and ge-
neric drug entry is between one and three months.59  Therefore, Senator 
Hatch and Representative Waxman sponsored the Act to strike a balance 
between extending patent terms to promote innovation in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry and incentivizing generic companies to introduce low-cost ver-
sions of drugs into the market more quickly.60 
Under the Act, brand-name drug manufacturers filing for new patents 
are required to submit an NDA to the FDA when seeking to market a new 
drug formula.61  The brand-name must still undertake the extensive—and 
expensive—health and safety testing that has always been required before 
the FDA will approve a drug for marketing.62  To encourage new drug de-
velopment, however, the Act also extended brand-name companies’ patent 
terms to make up for the time that brand-names’ patents are stuck in the 
FDA approval process.63  Once a drug is approved for marketing, the rele-
vant patent is entered in an annual FDA publication, Approved Drug Prod-
ucts with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, also known as the “Orange 
Book.”64  Conversely, Hatch-Waxman allows generic manufacturers to 
                                                          
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf; see also Henry 
Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharma-
ceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 492 (2007).   
 59.  INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 58, at 38–39.  
 60.  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th Cong. 1 (1984) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res.) (“On one hand, lower drug prices—tens of mil-
lions of dollars a year in total savings—will flow from increased generic competition made possi-
ble by a new abbreviated new drug application . . . for off-patent drugs approved after 1962.”); see 
also Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l., 256 F.3d 799, 801–02 (2001) (“In 1984 the Con-
gress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Amend-
ments) to, inter alia, simplify the procedure for FDA approval. . . .  Although the Congress was 
interested in increasing the availability of generic drugs, it also wanted to protect the patent rights 
of the pioneer applicants.”); Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 58, at 492 (“[T]he Hatch-Waxman Act 
provided for partial restoration of the patent time lost during the [brand-name manufacturer’s] 
regulatory review and clinical testing period [when the brand-name’s patent time begins running 
even before the patent is approved].”).  
 61.  21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(b) (2012).  
 62.  Id.; see also Dickey, Orszag & Tyson, supra note 57, at 369 (showing that it costs over 
one billion dollars and takes ten years to undergo new drug testing).  
 63.  See INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 58, at 39 (“The Hatch-
Waxman Act allows for patent extensions based on the amount of time a drug spends in the FDA 
review process.”). 
 64.  See FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS (ORANGE BOOK) iv (34th ed. 2014) (“Th[is] publication, Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (the List, commonly known as the Orange Book), iden-
tifies drug products approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) under [Section 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 of] the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.”).   
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“piggyback” on the testing carried out by the brand-name and to avoid con-
ducting the same costly testing if the generic files for permission to market 
its own version of a certain drug after the brand-name manufacturer has al-
ready gained FDA approval.65  Generics can file ANDAs and forgo the 
market testing requirements by asserting in their application that the generic 
is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug.66  Hatch-Waxman has arguably 
achieved its goal of making more generics available; the generic drug share 
of the prescription drug market grew from thirteen percent of the market in 
1984 to over fifty-eight percent in 1994.67 
In their ANDAs, generics must provide assurance to the FDA that the 
generic patent will not infringe on the brand-name’s patent.68  Generics can 
certify that their ANDAs will not infringe on a brand-name’s patent in four 
distinct ways; the certification method relevant to this case requires a gener-
ic to demonstrate that any bioequivalent patent held by a brand-name is 
“invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the 
drug described in the generic’s ANDA.69  In this assertion, generic firms 
can argue, for example, that a brand-name’s patent is invalid because it was 
obtained unfairly,70 or because it was “inherently anticipated by a prior 
                                                          
 65.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).  
 66.  Id. §§ 355 (j)(1), (2)(A)(iii)–(iv).  In order to establish bioequivalence, a generic must 
show that its drug has the same active ingredients as the brand-name drug and that the rate of ab-
sorption of the generic’s drug at the site at which it takes effect in the body is the same as the 
brand-name’s product.  Id.   
 67.  INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 58, at 38.  
 68.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).   
 69.  Id.; see, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 
2849 (2013) (mem.).  In K-Dur, brand-name pharmaceutical company Schering-Plough owned a 
patent for the extended-release coating of the drug K-Dur 20, a potassium chloride substance that 
is used to treat high blood pressure.  Id.  In 1995, prior to the expiration of Schering’s patent, 
Upsher-Smith Laboratories filed an ANDA for approval of a generic version of K-Dur 20, 
prompting Schering to file suit against Upsher for patent infringement.  Id. at 205.  Within para-
graph IV of its ANDA, and during discovery, Upsher certified that its generic product would not 
infringe on Schering’s patent because the chemical composition of Upsher’s controlled release 
coating was different from that of Schering’s brand-name drug.  Id.  See also In re Nexium 
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02409, 2013 WL 4832176 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013).  
In Nexium, generic drug company Ranbaxy filed an ANDA for a generic version of brand-name 
AstraZeneca’s heartburn medicine Nexium, alleging in a paragraph IV certification that 
Ranbaxy’s manufacture or sale of any generic version of Nexium would not infringe any of 
AstraZeneca’s patents for Nexium to the extent that they expired after October 2007.  Id. at *5.  
Plaintiffs in Nexium asserted that AstraZeneca’s patent for Nexium’s active ingredient was issued 
in error and would have been invalidated in the course of litigation because the active ingredient, 
having already been discovered and in the public domain, was unpatentable.  Id.   
 70.  See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (discussing a generic’s argument that a brand-name’s patent for ciprofloxacin hydro-
chloride would not be infringed because the brand-name had engaged in inequitable conduct in 
procuring its patent), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  Inequitable con-
duct is a defense to a claim of patent infringement in which a defendant argues that a patent-
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art.”71  This non-infringement certification is known as “paragraph IV” cer-
tification—named for its placement in paragraph IV of Section (j)(2)(A) of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act—and, likewise, disputes surrounding a generic’s 
attempt to certify that there is no infringement on a brand-name’s patent are 
known as “paragraph IV litigation.”72 
A related statute, the Patent and Protection of Patent Rights Act,73 
makes filing an ANDA under Hatch-Waxman an automatic act of patent in-
fringement.74  Hatch-Waxman therefore allows a brand-name manufacturer 
forty-five days in which to respond to a generic’s ANDA filing with a cause 
of action for infringement.75  If a brand-name brings a patent infringement 
suit against a generic ANDA filer within the forty-five day limit, the FDA 
must withhold approval of the generic’s patent until the later of thirty 
months from the date the suit is filed or the resolution of the lawsuit.76  No-
tably, once they enter the market, generic drugs become excessively popular 
as compared to their more costly brand-name alternatives.77  FDA studies 
show that one year after market entry, the average generic pharmaceutical 
product takes over ninety percent of a brand-name’s unit sales and sells at 
eighty-five percent of the price of the brand-name’s drug.78 
Hatch-Waxman also provides generics with a major incentive to be the 
first to file an ANDA and allege that a brand-name’s patent will not be in-
fringed.  The Act stipulates that, if its ANDA is approved, the generic ap-
plicant that is the first to file an abbreviated application (“first-to-file gener-
ic”) will have 180 days of exclusivity from the first commercial marketing 
                                                          
holder’s patent is invalid because the patent-holder misstated facts or misdescribed inventorship in 
the initial patent application.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1300 
(Fed. Cir. 2001).  
 71.  See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342, 1346 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (discussing a generic’s argument that a brand-name’s patent was invalid on the grounds 
of inherent anticipation by a prior patent).  Under the doctrine of inherent anticipation, a patent 
should be deemed invalid if a reference to prior art inherently discloses every feature of the 
claimed new invention.  Id. at 1343. 
 72.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012).  This Note will hereinafter refer to the litigation be-
tween brand-name and generic manufacturers in the context of a brand-name’s patent infringe-
ment challenge triggered by a generic’s filing an ANDA as “paragraph IV litigation.”   
 73.  35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).  
 74.  Id. § 271(e)(2).   
 75.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS 
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010) [hereinafter PAY-FOR-DELAY], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-
cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (noting 
that approximately one year after the first generic company enters the market for a particular drug, 
pharmacists fill about ninety percent of all prescriptions for that drug with the generic version, 
rather than the brand-name version).  
 78.  Id.   
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of its drug, during which time no other generic can compete with the first 
generic filer’s drug.79  The 180-day exclusivity period is awarded to a ge-
neric as soon as its ANDA is granted, but only takes effect and begins run-
ning at the time that the generic first enters the market.80  Thus, even if a 
generic’s entry is delayed by a number of years due to a provision in a set-
tlement agreement with its adversarial brand-name, discussed infra, the ge-
neric still retains its exclusivity rights for 180 days from the time when it 
finally markets its drug.81  This 180-day exclusivity period proves extreme-
ly lucrative for generic firms; during the time that they are the only generic 
on the market, companies can reap tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in 
extra sales.82 
Like most litigation, settlements are abundant in the paragraph IV con-
text.  An FTC study showed that between 1992 and 2002, approximately 
thirty-eight percent of pharmaceutical patent litigation related to ANDA 
paragraph IV certifications resulted in a settlement between brand-name 
and generic companies; and, of that thirty-eight percent, forty-five percent 
of the settlements resulted in payments, ranging from $1.75 million to 
$132.5 million, from the brand-name patent holder to the generic producer 
in exchange for delayed entry.83  Many of these payments come as compen-
sation to generics for agreeing to delay the marketing of their ANDA drug 
for a specified period of time.84  This agreement to delay entry so that the 
brand-name can remain exclusive, even after the generic’s approval for its 
ANDA drug, understandably piques antitrust interest.  Agreements involv-
ing payments between manufacturers in the same industry, for the purpose 
of perpetuating a monopoly that otherwise would not exist, would appear to 
                                                          
 79.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 281, 290 (2011) (citing Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing Innovation 
and Access: Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370, 370 (2009) (showing that 180 
days of patent exclusivity is worth $60 million per drug on average)).  
 83.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY 17, 31, 35 (2002) [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-
entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (noting that twenty out of fifty-
three (or thirty-eight percent) of patent litigation between a brand-name and the first generic 
ANDA filer resulted in settlement, and that of those twenty settlements, nine contained stipula-
tions for payments from the brand-name to the generic, which equals a total of forty-five percent 
of settlements involving a reverse payment).  
 84.  See id. at 31 (“Eight of the [nine] agreements [involving payments from brand-names to 
generics] followed the same basic model. Each prohibited the generic applicant from purchasing, 
manufacturing, using, selling, distributing, and shipping to third parties any form of the generic’s 
drug product until the expiration of the [brand-name’s] patents.”).   
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violate provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act,85 the main body of federal 
antitrust law.86  For example, in one paragraph IV litigation settlement 
agreement between brand-name manufacturer Hoecsht Marion Roussel, Inc. 
and generic manufacturer Andrx Pharmaceuticals, the brand-name agreed to 
pay the generic $40 million per year to delay entry into the market.87  In a 
similar settlement agreement regarding the patent for the breast cancer drug 
Tamoxifen, a brand-name paid a generic $21 million in exchange for vacat-
ing the district court’s judgment that the brand-name’s patent was invalid.88 
B.  Federal Circuit Courts Have Scrutinized Reverse Payment 
Settlements Under Three Standards: the Strictest “Per Se 
Illegality” Standard; the Lenient “Scope of the Patent” Test, and 
the Middle Ground “Quick Look Rule of Reason Analysis” 
1.  The Strictest Per Se Illegality Standard 
The Supreme Court has declared that “only unreasonable restraints” on 
trade violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,89 and has deemed cer-
tain types of restraints unreasonable and unlawful per se, because they have 
a “predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect.”90  Typical examples 
of per se unlawful violations of pro-competitive requirements are those that 
can be characterized as blatant restraints on competition pertaining to prices 
or territories.91 
                                                          
 85.  15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2012).  The Sherman Act is aimed at preserving free competition and 
preventing concentrated economic power from restricting trade.  Jeffrey C. Sun & Philip T.K. 
Daniel, The Sherman Act Antitrust Provisions and Collegiate Action: Should There Be a Contin-
ued Exception for the Business of the University?, 25 J.C. & U.L. 451, 453–54 (1999); see also 
infra Part II.B (discussing how reverse payment settlement agreements can potentially violate an-
titrust laws, primarily those contained in provisions of the Sherman Act). 
 86.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”); Id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopo-
lize . . . or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).   
 87.  In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 88.  In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 89.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).  
 90.  Id.  
 91.  See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 3 (“Absent compensation to the generic for the 
delay in its entry, such settlement agreements are unlikely to raise antitrust issues.”); see also 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (“Certain agreements, 
such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are thought so inherently anticompetitive 
that each is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it has actually caused.”); Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (“Horizontal price 
fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ 
approach because the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so high.”); N. Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“Among the practices which the courts have heretofore 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was the first 
federal appellate court to expressly consider reverse payment settlements in 
a similar context to the challenge brought in Actavis, and it found those set-
tlements to be per se violations of antitrust laws.92  In the pioneering D.C. 
Circuit case, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International,93 
generic drug company Andrx Pharmaceuticals was the first ANDA filer for 
the heart medication Cardizem CD, to which Hoecsht-Marion Roussel, Inc. 
(“HMRI”), a brand-name company, held the patent.94  When Andrx filed its 
ANDA, HMRI sued the generic for patent infringement, thereby triggering 
the thirty-month waiting period during which the FDA could not approve 
Andrx’s application.95  Andrx and HMRI never made it to court; after the 
thirty-month period, when the FDA finally approved Andrx’s ANDA, 
HMRI and Andrx entered into a settlement agreement in which HMRI 
agreed to compensate Andrx with quarterly payments of $10 million to de-
lay marketing the generic product.96  In effect, the HMRI-Andrx agreement 
allowed HMRI to pay off Andrx so that it could retain its monopoly on 
Cardizem CD even after the FDA had approved Andrx’s generic version for 
marketing.  The D.C. Circuit found that the agreement between HMRI and 
Andrx could “reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share 
and preserve monopolistic conditions,” and treated the payment from the 
brand-name to the generic as prima facie evidence of an illegal agreement 
not to compete.97 
In 2003, the Sixth Circuit heard In Re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litiga-
tion,98 which concerned the same agreement that the D.C. Circuit consid-
ered in Andrx.99  The Sixth Circuit case was brought by direct and indirect 
purchasers of the medicine Cardizem CD, who alleged that they suffered 
antitrust injury in the form of unnecessarily inflated drug prices as a result 
of Andrx’s agreement with HMRI to delay market entry of Andrx’s drug.100 
The Sixth Circuit held that the Andrx–HMRI agreement was “a horizontal 
agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD 
throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal re-
                                                          
deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing . . . division of markets . . . group 
boycotts . . . and tying arrangements.” (citations omitted)).  
 92.  Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 93.  256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 94.  Id. at 803.  
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id.   
 97.  Id. at 811, 813.  
 98.  332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 99.  Id. at 902–03.   
 100.  Id. at 903–04 & n.7.  
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straint of trade.”101  The court also emphasized a serious concern that re-
verse payment settlements encourage one manufacturer to pay another to 
stay out of a particular market, which effectively prevents other competitors 
from entering the market as well.102  Though these two courts found the re-
verse payment agreement in question to be per se illegal, all other federal 
courts that have considered the applicability of antitrust law to reverse 
payment settlements have declined to be as harsh and have not found such 
settlements to be irrebuttably presumptively invalid.103 
2.  The Lenient Scope of the Patent Test 
Most federal courts have utilized the “scope of the patent test” when 
tasked with determining whether particular reverse payment settlements vi-
olate antitrust law.104  The test presumes legality of reverse payment settle-
ments on the grounds that the authority conferred by a patent on a patent-
holder allows the patent-holder to do whatever he likes related to the patent, 
including exclude others from the market.105  Under the scope of the patent 
test, a reverse payment settlement is valid as long as it does not fall outside 
of the scope of the patent-holder’s monopoly and the protections given to 
the patent-holder by virtue of his holding a patent.106 
The Eleventh Circuit has considered the issue of reverse payment set-
tlements in three significant cases.  The first case, Valley Drug Co. v. Gene-
va Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,107 concerned two agreements in which a brand-
name manufacturer agreed to pay generic manufacturers $30 million to re-
frain from entering the market until the end of the brand-name’s patent 
                                                          
 101.  Id. at 908.  
 102.  Id. (“[I]t is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, 
but another thing altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by pay-
ing the only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”).  The Sixth Cir-
cuit’s concern regarding this reverse payment settlement partly stemmed from the fact that, in de-
laying Andrx’s generic entry, the Andrx-HMRI settlement agreement also prevented other 
generics, whose ANDAs for Cardizem CD had been approved by the FDA, from entering the 
market.  Id. at 907.  Andrx, as the first generic ANDA filer, retained its right to a 180-day period 
of exclusivity, which would begin running the day that Andrx’s generic product hit the market.  
Id.  In stalling Andrx’s market entry, HMRI and Andrx were also effectively stalling the entry of 
other generic competitors who could not market their versions of Cardizem CD until Andrx’s 180-
day period of exclusivity had run out.  Id.   
 103.  See infra Parts II.B.2–II.B.3.  
 104.  See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Federal, Second, and 
Eleventh Circuits’ use of the “scope of the patent test”).  
 105.  See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304–06, 1312  (11th Cir. 
2003).   
 106.  Id. at 1312. 
 107.  344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).  In this case, a brand-name drug manufacturer filed 
claims against generic manufacturers for patent infringement, and the generic manufacturers de-
fended on the ground of patent invalidity.  Id. at 1298–99.  
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term.108  Even though the patent at issue was subsequently declared inva-
lid,109 the Eleventh Circuit held that the patent gave the brand-name manu-
facturer the right to exclude competitors.110  In so ruling, the court empha-
sized policy considerations favoring the settlement of patent litigation.111  
The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case and directed the district court to de-
termine whether any part of the agreement exceeded the protections afford-
ed by the brand-name manufacturer’s patent and, if so, to apply traditional 
antitrust scrutiny only to those portions of the agreement.112  The court 
therefore articulated and employed a scope of the patent test to analyze the 
legality of the reverse payment settlement.113 
A subsequent Eleventh Circuit case, Schering–Plough Corp. v. Feder-
al Trade Commission,114 arose out of the settlement agreement between a 
brand-name, Schering-Plough, and a generic, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, 
regarding the marketing of, and patent for, the hypertension drug K-Dur 
20.115  After the FTC determined, during an administrative proceeding, that 
the agreement violated antitrust laws, the defendants appealed the FTC’s 
finding to the Eleventh Circuit.116  Applying the scope of the patent test ar-
ticulated in Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit set aside the ruling of the 
FTC.117  The court rejected the FTC’s conclusion that Schering’s $60 mil-
lion payment to Upsher was in exchange only for a market entry delay, 
finding instead that the payment was only for the licenses that Schering ob-
tained through the agreement to market five Upsher products.118  As such, 
the court found that there was no reverse payment from Schering to Upsher 
and, thus, no antitrust violation in that agreement.119 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,120 the 
predecessor to this Note’s principal case, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly ar-
ticulated, in accordance with its past holdings regarding reverse payment 
                                                          
 108.  Id. at 1300.  
 109.  Id. at 1306.  
 110.  Id. at 1312 (“We recognize the patent exception to antitrust liability, but also recognize 
that the exception is limited by the terms of the patent and the statutory rights granted to the pa-
tentee. . . .  The appropriate analysis on remand will likely require an identification of the protec-
tion afforded by the patents . . . .”).  
 111.  Id. at 1308 n.20.  
 112.  Id. at 1312.  
 113.  Id.  
 114.  402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).  
 115.  Id. at 1058–59.   
 116.  Id. at 1061. 
 117.  Id. at 1065–66, 1076.  
 118.  Id. at 1069–71.  
 119.  Id. at 1071.  
 120.  677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013).  
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settlements, that the only determination required in such actions is whether, 
“absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent,” the settlement 
agreement exceeded the scope of the patent.121 
The Eleventh Circuit’s standard is thus articulated in commentary as 
the scope of the patent test.122  Under this standard, the court examines: “(1) 
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which 
the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive ef-
fects.”123  Because this standard focuses on the nearly endless rights that a 
patent-holder retains as part of its patent monopoly—including the right to 
cripple competition and charge artificially higher prices124—the scope of 
the patent test is viewed as giving a presumption of nearly irrefutable va-
lidity for reverse payment settlements.125 
In 2006, the Second Circuit heard In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litigation126 and affirmatively adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s scope of the 
patent test.127  The settlement at issue in Tamoxifen called for the brand-
name manufacturer to make a payment of $21 million to the generic manu-
facturer in exchange for the generic’s request that the district court vacate 
its decision that the brand-name’s patent for Tamoxifen was invalid.128  De-
spite awareness of the district court’s initial finding, the Second Circuit ap-
plied a presumption of patent validity and held that, absent the patent being 
obtained by fraud, there is “no injury to the market cognizable existing un-
der antitrust law, as long as competition is restrained only within the scope 
                                                          
 121.  Id. at 1312.   
 122.  See, e.g., Timothy A. Cook, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balanc-
ing Patent & Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 417, 433 (2011) (referring to the Eleventh Circuit’s test as a “patent-scope analysis”); Shan-
non U. Han, Note, Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-Splitting Headache Plaguing Big Phar-
ma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 926, 939 (2013) (referring to the Eleventh Circuit’s test as 
the “scope of the patent test”).  
 123.  Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066; Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 
F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 124.  See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1304 (“A patent grants its owner the lawful right to ex-
clude others.  This exclusionary right is granted to allow the patentee to exploit whatever degree 
of market power it might gain thereby as an incentive to induce investment in innovation and the 
public disclosure of inventions.  The exclusionary right cannot be exploited in every way—
patentees cannot pool their patents and fix the prices at which licensees will sell the patented arti-
cle, for example—but a patentee can choose to exclude everyone from producing the patented ar-
ticle or can choose to be the sole supplier itself . . . .”  (citations omitted)).  
 125.  See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e take issue with 
the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.”), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 
2849 (2013) (mem.).   
 126.  466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 127.  Id. at 213.  
 128.  Id. at 190.   
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of the patent.”129  The Second Circuit recognized the potentially troubling 
implications of its holding, that “[t]he less sound the patent . . . and there-
fore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder, the more a 
rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder.”130  Ulti-
mately, however, the court determined that the judicial preference for set-
tlement was too strong not to find the reverse payment settlement agree-
ment presumptively lawful.131 
The Federal Circuit also utilized the scope of the patent test in its ad-
judication of In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,132 a 
case involving a pharmaceutical reverse payment settlement between a 
brand-name pharmaceutical giant, Bayer, and a generic manufacturer, Barr 
Laboratories, in paragraph IV litigation over Barr’s ANDA for Ciprofloxa-
cin, an antibiotic used to treat various infections, including anthrax infec-
tion.133  In exchange for Barr dropping its patent validity challenge to 
Bayer’s NDA drug and its paragraph IV certification, Bayer agreed to pay 
Barr $398.1 million over a number of years, including an initial payment of 
$49.1 million.134  The Federal Circuit used the scope of the patent test and 
rejected the antitrust challenge to the Bayer-Barr reverse payment settle-
ment, reasoning that “[s]ettlement of patent claims by agreement between 
the parties—including exchange of consideration—rather than by litigation 
is not precluded by the Sherman Act even though it may have some adverse 
effects on competition.”135  The court thus gave weight to judicial partiality 
toward settlement in deciding that “in the absence of evidence of fraud . . . 
or sham litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the patent in 
the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse pay-
ment.”136 
3.  The Middle Ground “Quick Look Rule of Reason” Analysis 
The Third Circuit did not adopt the “scope of the patent test” and in-
stead applied a “quick look rule of reason” test in In re K-Dur Antitrust Lit-
igation.137  The determination of antitrust violations under this test is based 
on a three-step “rule of reason” analysis.  First, the plaintiff “‘bears the ini-
                                                          
 129.  Id. at 212–13 (citation omitted).  
 130.  Id. at 211. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013).  
 133.  Id. at 1327–29.  
 134.  Id. at 1328–29 & n.5.  
 135.  Id. at 1333 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 & n.5 (1931)).  
 136.  Id. at 1333, 1336.   
 137.  686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-
Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) (mem.).  
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tial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market.’”138  Then, if the plaintiff suc-
ceeds, “‘the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive 
“redeeming virtues” of the action.’”139  If the defendant carries his burden, 
the plaintiff must then show that “‘the same pro-competitive effect could be 
achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competi-
tion.’”140  In K-Dur, the Third Circuit chose a middle ground between the 
per se illegality standard and the “scope of the patent test,” explaining that 
it would examine a pay-for-delay situation using a modified version of the 
rule of reason analysis: a “quick look rule of reason test.”141  Under this 
analysis, any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger 
that agrees to delay entry into the market is a presumptively illegal restraint 
of trade.142  This presumption can be rebutted, however, by a demonstration 
“that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) of-
fers some pro-competitive benefit.”143 
The Third Circuit rejected the Eleventh, Sixth, and Second Circuits’ 
presumption of patent validity under the scope of the patent test because 
many patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) are later 
found invalid or not infringed.  Therefore, the correct standard is one that 
adjudges patents based on the strong likelihood that “reverse payments ena-
ble the holder of a patent that the holder knows is weak to buy its way out 
of both competition with the challenging competitor and possible invalida-
tion of the patent.”144  To resolve the standards dispute among the federal 
circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Actavis.145 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit’s holding that reverse payment settlement agreements are immune 
from antitrust proceedings and remanded the case for further proceed-
                                                          
 138.  Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id. 
 141.  In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.   
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 215 (citing In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2005)).  
 145.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).  This dispute was further exacerbated 
when the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s harsher quick look rule of reason analysis in 
favor of its own lenient scope of the patent test.  FTC v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1309 
(2012).  
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ings.146  In so doing, the Court made clear it was not ruling on whether the 
FTC had a legitimate claim against Actavis for anti-competition conspiracy; 
rather, the Court simply held that antitrust law was eligible to govern the 
instant patent dispute, and thus the case should not have been dismissed.147  
The Court placed great emphasis on Solvay Pharmaceutical’s having been 
embroiled in a litigation dispute with Actavis and other generics regarding 
the validity of Solvay’s patent because, according to the Court, only a defin-
itively valid patent “‘excludes all except its owner from the use of the pro-
tected process or product.’”148  An invalid patent, therefore, gives its owner 
no such power.149  Because the paragraph IV litigation put Solvay’s patent 
validity at issue, the Court concluded that the right to exclusivity that would 
normally be conferred to Solvay, by virtue of its holding the patent for An-
droGel, did not apply.150  The Court found that exclusivity and monopoly 
rights can only accompany valid patents; thus, where a patent may not be 
valid, a court logically cannot find that a patent-holder acted within the 
scope of his patent rights because those rights may not exist.151 
The Court further held that the Eleventh Circuit’s sole reliance on pa-
tent law, as opposed to antitrust law or pro-competitive policy, was errone-
ous, particularly given the FTC’s stated concerns regarding the anti-
competitive consequences of the settlement.152  From the FTC’s perspec-
tive, the situation appeared clear: a brand-name pharmaceutical giant had 
paid off generic manufacturers to delay entry into a competitive drug mar-
ket, thereby ensuring that the brand-name’s monopoly would continue to 
thrive.153 
The Court substantiated its holding by looking to its prior decisions in 
antitrust-patent settlement cases outside of the pharmaceutical realm.  In 
United States v. Line Material Co.,154 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,155 
and Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical 
Corp.,156 which all involved antitrust attacks on patent-related settlements 
in various machinery industries, the Court resolved questions of settlement 
                                                          
 146.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.  Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.  Justice Alito took no part in 
the consideration or decision of the case.  
 147.  Id. at 2227.   
 148.  Id. at 2231 (quoting United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)).  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. at 2230–31.   
 152.  Id. at 2231.  
 153.  Id. at 2230.  
 154.  333 U.S. 287 (1948).  
 155.  333 U.S. 364 (1948).  
 156.  382 U.S. 172 (1965).  
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legality by balancing the “lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly 
and the illegal restraint prohibited by the Sherman Act.”157  According to 
the majority, in these historical cases the Court examined traditional anti-
trust principles, such as the probability that anti-competitive effects would 
flow from the settlement, instead of looking solely at the rights that the pa-
tent conferred.158  Moreover, the majority noted that antitrust laws may be 
applicable to patent litigation because the Supreme Court has found that pa-
tent-related settlements can violate antitrust laws.159 
The Court concluded its analysis by summarizing policy and fairness 
considerations that favored giving the FTC an opportunity to litigate its an-
titrust claim.160  First, the Court emphasized the importance of allowing an 
antitrust challenge to the reverse payment agreement between Solvay and 
Actavis (and other generics) because the pay-for-delay term in their agree-
ment appeared on its face to have the potential for anti-competitive ef-
fects.161  The Court also asserted that because the payments made from 
brand-names to generics in reverse payment settlement agreements might be 
perfectly legitimate (for example, such a payment might be made to cover a 
generic’s litigation costs, which is a valid settlement provision that does not 
violate antitrust law), this potential legitimacy does not justify dismissing 
an allegedly injured plaintiff’s complaint.162  Just as the defendant should 
have an opportunity to explain his settlement payment and to avoid liability, 
so too should a plaintiff, in this case the FTC, retain the right to challenge 
that settlement payment if the plaintiff is suspicious about its collusive ef-
fects.163 
Although the Court acknowledged the possible applicability of anti-
trust law to pay-for-delay arrangements, it ultimately declined to conclude 
that reverse payment settlement agreements are unlawful, and even declined 
to decide the instant issue.164  Instead, the Court held that the FTC’s anti-
trust claim should have had an opportunity to be heard, and remanded the 
case.165 
                                                          
 157.  Line Material Co., 333 U.S. at 310.  
 158.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.   
 159.  Id. at 2232; see also, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 190–92 (1963) 
(finding illegal and in violation of antitrust law a settlement between three sewing machine manu-
facturers with competing patent claims, in which the firms assigned the patent rights to the manu-
facturer best able to defend and to enforce the patent against future competition).   
 160.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–37.   
 161.  Id. at 2234.  
 162.  Id. at 2236.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at 2237. 
 165.  Id. at 2238.  
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In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thom-
as, relied on a precedential argument to dispute the majority’s holding.166  
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that a patent “provides an exception to 
antitrust law, and the scope of the patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the 
patent—forms the zone within which the patent holder may operate without 
facing antitrust liability.”167  The Chief Justice noted that the Court had 
“never held that it violates antitrust law for a competitor to refrain from 
challenging a patent . . . [and had] long recognized that the settlement of pa-
tent litigation does not by itself violate the antitrust laws.”168  According to 
the dissent, the Court would be “cross[ing] [the] Rubicon,” doing some-
thing that had never been done in the 123-year existence of the Sherman 
Act, in allowing antitrust law to dictate the legality of patent infringement 
settlements.169  Further, the dissent argued that only patent law should apply 
in patent cases, where the subject matter is both unique in and of itself and 
insulated from punishment by other laws.170 
The dissent instead advocated for the use of the lenient “scope of the 
patent” standard, and argued that the majority should have adopted this 
standard as the fundamental test for adjudging reverse payment settle-
ments.171  In so reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts opined that the majority 
had misinterpreted the essential holdings of prior cases that examined pa-
tent-related settlements in various industries, such as electrical devices and 
sewing.172  According to the dissent, these cases stand for the proposition 
that “patent settlements—and for that matter, any agreements relating to pa-
tents—are subject to antitrust scrutiny only if they confer benefits beyond 
the scope of the patent.”173  Moreover, the dissent stated the fact that patent-
related settlement agreements can sometimes violate antitrust laws does not 
necessitate subjecting a patent settlement to antitrust scrutiny, particularly 
not, as the majority reasoned, because the validity of the patent is uncer-
                                                          
 166.  Id. at 2238–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 167.  Id. at 2238. 
 168.  Id. at 2239.   
 169.  Id. at 2242.  
 170.  Id. at 2240. 
 171.  Id. at 2239; see also supra Part II.B (explaining that the scope of the patent standard 
views reverse payment settlements as presumptively lawful exercises within the scope of the mo-
nopoly power conferred on patent-holders by the virtue of their holding patents).  
 172.  Id. at 2240–41.  Chief Justice Roberts cited United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 
287 (1948), United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963), United States v. New 
Wrinkle, Inc., 324 U.S. 371 (1952), and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), as 
examples of cases that the majority misinterpreted in Justice Breyer’s opinion.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 2242.  In contrast, in his majority opinion, Justice Breyer had held that cases like 
Line Material and Standard Oil stand for the proposition that antitrust law in fact must apply to 
patent-related settlements.  Id. at 2232–33 (majority opinion).  
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tain.174  Lastly, the dissent noted that the significant costs of patent litiga-
tion and the judicial preference for settlement should predominate over con-
cerns about patent validity, and that these economic interests would there-
fore seem to mandate use of the scope of the patent test.175 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Court’s holding in Actavis struck the correct balance in character-
izing reverse payment settlements as not per se illegal, and yet not immune 
from antitrust attack.176  The Court, however, missed two crucial opportuni-
ties to clarify this area of the law, particularly in light of the fact that Ac-
tavis was the first reverse payment settlement case the Court has chosen to 
hear.177 
First, in refusing to announce a comprehensive test for application of 
the rule of reason analysis, the Court did not fully resolve the issue of how 
to evaluate reverse payment settlements—an issue that has beleaguered fed-
eral circuit courts for the past two decades.178  Rather than skirt the issue as 
it did, the Court should have declared that the Third Circuit’s quick look 
rule of reason analysis is the proper standard by which to judge brand-
name-generic settlements that include pay-for-delay clauses.179  Among the 
several disparate frameworks for judging reverse payment settlements 
adopted by the federal circuit courts, the Third Circuit’s quick look rule of 
reason analysis most effectively balances the need to incentivize brand-
name drug development with the need to encourage generic market entry in 
order to create competition and lower drug prices, as Hatch-Waxman in-
tended.180  The quick look rule of reason analysis provides a stricter stand-
ard of scrutiny to ensure that a reverse payment settlement is legitimate and 
not a manifestation of anti-competitive practices or a desire to maintain an 
illegal market monopoly.181  Moreover, announcing an authoritative, com-
prehensive standard, and giving examples of how that standard would apply 
to typical reverse payment agreements, would ease administrability for 
                                                          
 174.  Id. at 2242 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 175.  Id. at 2243–44.  
 176.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 177.  See infra Parts IV.B–C.  
 178.  See supra Part III.  
 179.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 180.  See 130 CONG. REC. 24,430 (daily ed., Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman) 
(“[Proposed amendments to Hatch-Waxman that were later incorporated] do not upset the funda-
mental balance of the bill that assures consumers of more low-cost generic drugs when a valid 
patent expires and the drug industry of sufficient incentive to develop innovative pharmaceutical 
therapies.”).   
 181.  See infra Part IV.B.  
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courts determining the legality of reverse payment settlements going for-
ward.182 
Second, although the Court explicitly refrained from finding reverse 
payment settlements per se illegal, the majority opinion reveals dissatisfac-
tion with the reverse payment model that is the inevitable result of Hatch-
Waxman’s regulatory design.183  As such, the Court should have recom-
mended, as a policy consideration for lower courts, a requirement of judi-
cial settlement approval for future reverse payment agreements.184  This 
policy would likely discourage brand-name drug manufacturers from bring-
ing frivolous suits to defend knowingly weak or non-infringed patents, and 
would also allow generic manufacturers to more easily defend their patent 
claims and disincentivize their knee-jerk settlement reaction.185  Such a pol-
icy recommendation would target and eliminate the risk-seeking and risk-
averse behavior that induces brand-names and generics to settle, and would 
therefore address the root problem of ubiquitous reverse payment settle-
ments that negatively impact consumers.186 
A.  The Court’s Holding Struck the Correct Balance Between Per Se 
Illegality of Reverse Settlement Payments and Immunity from 
Antitrust Attack 
1. The Court Appropriately Found That Reverse Payment 
Settlements Are Not Per Se Illegal 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court declined to find reverse payment set-
tlements per se illegal restraints on trade,187 despite their essential character 
as a collusive market allocation in the pharmaceutical sphere.188  Two spec-
                                                          
 182.  See infra Part IV.B; see also Steven J. Cernak & Kelly L. Morron, District Courts Strug-
gle to Apply Direction from Actavis in Reverse Payment Cases Re: Antitrust Litigation, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/district-courts-struggle-to-apply-
direction-actavis-reverse-payment-cases-re-antitru (“In its 2013 opinion in FTC v. Actavis, the 
Supreme Court . . . instructed lower courts to apply antitrust law’s rule of reason to so-called ‘re-
verse payment’ cases.”).  
 183.  See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013) (“[T]here is nothing novel about 
our approach.  What does appear novel [as a legal doctrine] are the dissent’s suggestions that a 
patent holder may simply ‘pa[y] a competitor to’ . . . quit its patent invalidity or noninfringement 
claim without any antitrust scrutiny.”); Id. at 2230 (“[W]e do not agree that [holding a patent] . . . 
can immunize [a reverse payment] agreement from antitrust attack.”); see also Dolin, supra note 
82, at 283 (“The rise of reverse settlement agreements is a direct consequence of the incentives 
created by the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).  
 184.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 185.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 186.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 187.  See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining per se illegal restraints on trade).  
 188.  See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The 
[settlement] [a]greement guaranteed to [the brand-name manufacturer] that its only potential com-
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ulative reasons exist for the Court’s decision not to find the pay-for-delay 
process presumptively unlawful.  First, courts are generally unwilling to 
apply per se proscriptions to potentially violative conduct that arises in new 
industries or in areas where such a finding of anti-competitive infringement 
has not previously been made or considered.189  Because only the Sixth and 
D.C. Circuits have concluded that reverse payment settlements are pre-
sumptively unlawful,190 it is likely the Court was hesitant to announce a 
strict per se illegal standard in an unfamiliar area.  This conjecture is espe-
cially credible in light of the fact that it is often unclear how a court would 
acquire enough experience in an area to deem a seemingly horizontal 
agreement as a naked, per se violation.191 
Second, and more significantly, the Court would have been erroneous 
in concluding that reverse payment settlements are per se illegal because, in 
paragraph IV litigation, the brand-name’s patent is not always invalid or the 
generic’s patent does not always infringe.  The FTC has shown that gener-
ics prevail in seventy-three percent of patent challenge cases; but, that fig-
ure leaves over twenty-five percent of cases in which the generic’s attempt-
                                                          
petitor at that time . . . would, for the price of $10 million per quarter, refrain from marketing its 
generic version of Cardizem CD even after it had obtained FDA approval. . . .  There is simply no 
escaping the conclusion that the [a]greement . . . was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to elimi-
nate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic ex-
ample of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”).  Federal courts have found that market allocations in 
other arenas are also facially blatant horizontal restraints on trade such that they are per se unlaw-
ful.  See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (finding a market allocation 
where two bar exam companies agreed not to compete with one another in certain areas was fa-
cially unlawful); United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding per se 
illegal an agreement between billboard advertising companies that prohibited one another from 
competing from each other’s former leaseholds for one year after a billboard space was “lost or 
abandoned”).  
 189.  See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986) (“[W]e have been 
slow . . . to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships 
where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.”); United States v. 
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (“It is only after considerable experience with 
certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations . . . .”). 
 190.  See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907–08 (holding that a reverse payment settlement 
agreement was “at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market,” and 
was therefore a “classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade”); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. 
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a pay-for-delay agreement 
between generic and brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers fell in the category of per se ille-
gality because it could be viewed as an effort to “preserve monopolistic conditions”).  
 191.  See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 896–97 (D. Minn. 1992) (apply-
ing a rule of reason analysis, as opposed to finding per se illegal a series of rules governing foot-
ball teams’ first refusal and compensation rights following the expiration of player contracts, de-
spite having considered per se illegality in such instances in earlier decisions).  But cf. Ariz. v. 
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349, 357 (1982) (holding that a maximum fee ar-
rangement among medical service providers was per se illegal, despite having never addressed the 
antitrust implications of a similar arrangement in the medical arena).  
SchipperFinalAuthorReview 5/6/2014  12:34 PM 
1264 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:1240 
ed entry into the market would impede on a brand-name’s patent.192  More-
over, although some patent law scholars believe that paragraph IV litigation 
is a signal of patent invalidity,193 Professor William Landes and Judge 
Richard Posner have presented data that contradicts the FTC’s arguments 
for patent weakness, including a “remarkable increase” in patent validity 
holdings since the beginning of the Federal Circuit.194  Prior to the Federal 
Circuit’s inception, courts held patents valid in approximately forty-five 
percent of cases; but the Federal Circuit, which has been starkly in favor of 
finding patent validity, has increased that number to the sixty-five to seven-
ty percent range.195  In many instances, then, it is evident that much para-
graph IV litigation has ended and could end in a brand-name’s patent being 
held valid.  If the Court had declared a standard that presumed illegality of 
reverse payment settlements, brand-names would be unfairly limited in 
their capacity to dictate the settlement terms of unfair challenges to their 
rightly-held patents before litigation.  Furthermore, they would thereby im-
properly diminish the judicial resources that should appropriately be at their 
disposal. 
2.  The Court Properly Found That Reverse Payment Settlements 
Can Be Analyzed Using Antitrust Law 
In addition to finding that pay-for-delay is not a per se illegal practice, 
the Court also correctly held that antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay set-
tlements are very much justiciable, and that the legality of such settlements 
can be judged based on antitrust principles.  Typical private antitrust actions 
for damages require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s re-
straints on trade caused the plaintiff injury in fact, or, if seeking injunctive 
relief, that the defendant’s actions threatened the plaintiff with loss or dam-
age by a violation of the antitrust laws.196  When the FTC brings a claim 
against generic and brand-name drug manufacturers for anti-competitive 
collusion, the government must show that the agreement in question had an 
injurious impact on consumers participating in the pharmaceutical indus-
                                                          
 192.  GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 83, at 13, 20.  
 193.  See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Liti-
gated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998) (analyzing how patents fare in court).  
 194.  Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for Innovation: Rejecting the FTC’s Stance Against 
Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 248 (2006) (citing 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 338–39 (2003)).  
 195.  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338 tbl.12.1 (2003); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25–30 (1989) (exam-
ining the Federal Circuit’s pro-patent stance).  
 196.  15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 26 (2012).  
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try.197  In their challenges to reverse payment settlements, including Ac-
tavis, the FTC has alleged that massive public economic injury, to the tune 
of $3.5 billion, results from the pay-for-delay framework.198  The FTC ar-
gues that this framework not only denies consumers access to competitive 
pricing on pharmaceuticals, but also forces consumers to pay the brand-
name’s costs included in the reverse payment settlement amounts trans-
ferred to generics in the form of increased brand-name drug prices.199 
Despite the FTC’s demonstration of injury-in-fact to consumers, the 
Eleventh Circuit held—prior to Actavis—that although antitrust laws would 
ordinarily prohibit pay-for-delay arrangements,200 reverse payment settle-
ments in the patent arena present “atypical cases” because one of the parties 
owns a patent, giving them the legal right to a monopoly.201  This presump-
tion of patent validity, combined with the heavy weight of public policy in 
favor of settlement, led the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that courts could 
not force parties to continue litigating in order to avoid a possible violation 
of antitrust principles.202 
As the Court in Actavis recognized, the Eleventh Circuit’s determina-
tion of the non-justiciability of the FTC’s claim turned on an erroneous pre-
sumption that the brand-name company’s patent is always valid.203  Alt-
hough some federal courts have refused to consider patent validity when 
scrutinizing reverse payment settlements204 because patents are presumed 
                                                          
 197.  Marlee P. Kutcher, Comment, Waiting Is the Hardest Part: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Adopt the Third Circuit’s Analysis of Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements, 44 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1093, 1151 (2013).  
 198.  See id. at 2.  
 199.  See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 2 (finding that pay-for-delay arrangements cost 
Americans $3.5 billion per year); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, 
AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, A REPORT 
BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130117mmareport.pdf (finding that the number of 
reverse payment settlements rose from twenty-eight in 2011 to forty in 2012, and involved brand-
name pharmaceutical products with combined annual U.S. sales of $8.3 billion). 
 200.  Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 201.  FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC 
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  
 202.  Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (citing Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d at 1313–14).  
 203.  Id. at 2231.  
 204.  See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“[I]n the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court need not 
consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a 
reverse payment.”), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the validity of the patent 
need not be considered in the analysis of whether the settlement agreement violates antitrust law), 
abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  
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valid by law,205 such refusal is in error given two propositions.  First, the 
refusal to consider patent validity in adjudging reverse payment settlements 
ignores the aforementioned FTC findings that the majority of generic chal-
lenges to brand-name patents reveal the brand-name patent’s weakness,206 
which can thereby often make the brand-name’s claim of patent infringe-
ment frivolous.  Second, refusal to consider patent validity ignores the fact 
that “[a] patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal conclusion 
reached by the Patent Office,”207 and not an infallible proclamation, as 
demonstrated by the FTC’s study.208 
B.  The Court Should Have Adopted the Third Circuit’s Quick Look 
Rule of Reason Analysis 
As previously discussed, the Third Circuit announced in In re K-Dur 
that it would break from the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits’ pro-
settlement scope of the patent test, which mandates an irrefutable presump-
tion of the brand-name’s existing patent validity and is grounded in the 
principle that patent holders can do what they please within the scope of the 
patent’s monopoly protections.209  Instead of adopting this lenient frame-
work, the Third Circuit implemented a “quick look rule of reason analysis,” 
in which a finder of fact must treat “any payment from a patent holder to a 
generic patent challenger as part of an agreement that delays the generic’s 
market entry as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.”210  The quick look rule of reason analysis falls between the lenient 
scope of the patent test and the harsh per se rule of illegality for “predicta-
ble and pernicious” restraints.211  Fundamentally, the quick look rule of rea-
son test differs from the scope of the patent test in that the former specifies 
a rebuttable presumption of reverse payment settlement illegality, while the 
latter specifies a rebuttable presumption of legality. 
FTC v. Actavis marked the first time the Supreme Court heard a pay-
for-delay case, both despite and because of the fact that the legality of re-
                                                          
 205.  35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).  
 206.  See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 83, at viii (find-
ing that generic drug companies prevailed in seventy-three percent of cases wherein they chal-
lenged a brand-name’s patent validity); see also PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 3 (same).   
 207.  In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Ad-
kins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith 
Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) (mem.). 
 208.  PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 3.   
 209.  In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209; see also supra Part II.C (explaining the Third Circuit’s im-
plementation of a new “quick look rule of reason” analysis for pay-for-delay agreements and how 
it differs from other federal circuits’ “scope of the patent” test).  
 210.  In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.  
 211.  See supra Parts II.B.1–2.   
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verse payment settlements had been litigated in federal courts for dec-
ades.212  Given that the Court granted the FTC’s petition for certiorari pre-
cisely to resolve the issue that different standards are used by the courts in 
reverse payment settlement cases,213 it is perplexing that the Court did not 
in fact annunciate a workable set of criteria for courts to use in future cases.  
The Court ultimately declared that the FTC’s challenge to the Actavis-
Solvay settlement was justiciable, and that a typical antitrust rule of reason 
test could be used; however, in declining to adopt either the scope of the pa-
tent test or the quick look rule of reason analysis, the Court avoided the 
most essential issue of the case.  Ruling on the overall legality of reverse 
payment settlement claims, without explaining in detail the test that should 
be employed to adjudicate such claims, is remarkably problematic.  Conse-
quently, this failure on the part of the Court has already resulted in confu-
sion among federal courts faced with pay-for-delay challenges.214 
1.  The Court Correctly Declined to Adopt the Scope of the Patent 
Test 
The Court in Actavis should have announced a definitive standard and, 
in doing so, should have adopted the Third Circuit’s quick look rule of rea-
son analysis over the scope of the patent test.215  As discussed in Part IV.A, 
the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of patent va-
lidity ignores the reality that generic challengers often prevail in paragraph 
IV litigation.216  This further undermines the appropriateness of using the 
scope of the patent test and its presumption of patent validity in pay-for-
delay cases.  Reverse payment settlements thereby enable a brand-name pa-
tent holder—that knows its patent is weak—to buy its way out of competi-
tion and into a greater period of monopoly than it would rightly have if its 
patent were invalid.217 
                                                          
 212.  See supra Parts I & II.B (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Actavis to 
resolve the competing standards used by federal courts in judging reverse payment settlements, 
and discussing those varying standards). 
 213.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).  
 214.  See Cernak & Morron, supra note 182 (noting that the U.S. District Courts for the Dis-
tricts of Massachusetts and New Jersey have struggled to apply the Court’s “ambiguous guidance” 
set forth in Actavis).   
 215.  See supra Parts II.C.2–3.  
 216.  See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 83, at viii  (find-
ing that in paragraph IV litigation, generic challengers prevailed seventy-three percent of the 
time); see also Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside 
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380, 385 (2000) (finding that between 1983 and 1999, the 
alleged infringer (the generic) prevailed in forty-two percent of paragraph IV cases that reached 
trial).   
 217.  In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).   
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Moreover, the scope of the patent test does not properly address 
whether a generic’s patent indeed infringes on a brand-name’s patent.  In 
some paragraph IV cases, generics filing an ANDA purport, and can objec-
tively show, that their desired patent does not infringe because it conveys 
the rights to something fundamentally different from what the brand-name 
holds.218  In other cases, generic challengers can rightfully assert that their 
patents will not infringe because a brand-name’s patent will have expired 
by the time that the generic version of the drug is marketable.219  Yet, in 
both of these scenarios, where it is clear that there is no infringement and 
the brand-name’s patent validity is not even in question, brand-name manu-
facturers pursue patent infringement suits against generic drug companies, 
which yield exorbitant settlement agreements for generics and perpetuate 
the pay-for-delay framework.220  Because the scope of the patent test pre-
sumes patent validity and solely examines whether a patent holder’s settle-
ment action exceeds the scope of its monopoly, it cannot effectively be used 
to judge settlement situations where the issue of validity was irrelevant be-
cause the generic simply would not infringe.  If the applicable test focuses 
on brand-name patent validity, injured challengers cannot possibly win an 
antitrust claim against a reverse payment settlement wherein the patent’s 
validity was never even at issue.  The quick look rule of reason analysis, 
however, provides a proper framework for adjudging reverse payment set-
tlements because, rather than focusing on the validity of the patent in ques-
tion, it focuses on the context, the terms of the settlement, and the “econom-
ic realities” of pay-for-delay that cost consumers billions.221 
2.  The Court Should Have Affirmatively Adopted the Quick Look 
Rule of Reason Analysis 
In contrast to the scope of the patent test, the quick look rule of reason 
analysis provides a balance between respecting brand-name patent-holders’ 
rights and allowing generic manufacturers to enter the market when they are 
confident that their drug will not infringe.  In finding a pay-for-delay provi-
                                                          
 218.  See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).  In 
Cardizem, brand-name manufacturer Hoecsht Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMRI”) held the patent for 
the “dissolution profile” (the amount of a drug to be released into a person’s system in a given 
period) of zero to forty-five percent of the active ingredient in the prescription hypertension drug 
Cardizem CD.  Id.  In its ANDA to market a generic version of the drug, generic manufacturer 
Andrx Pharmaceuticals specified that its formula had a dissolution profile of not less than fifty-
five percent.  Id.  Despite the disparate dissolution profiles, HMRI “nonetheless” continued to pur-
sue patent infringement litigation against Andrx.  Id.  
 219.  E.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 220.  See supra Parts II.A–B (discussing the high prices that brand-names will pay to generics 
to delay generic market entry through paragraph IV litigation reverse payment settlements).  
 221.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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sion in a generic-brand name settlement to be rebuttable prima facie evi-
dence of an antitrust violation,222 the quick look rule of reason analysis tar-
gets the harmful collusion that is the fundamental problem with these set-
tlements.  At the crux of anti-competitive issues with reverse payment 
settlements is that generic drug manufacturers are monetarily incentivized 
to delay entry and disincentivized to pursue litigation, even when they are 
confident that they will not infringe on a brand-name’s patent.  Nothing in 
the Third Circuit’s quick look rule of reason analysis limits parties’ ability 
to reach settlements or negotiate generic drug entry dates without compen-
sation for delay.223  Instead, only settlements in which a brand-name pays a 
generic to stay out of a particular market will require the manufacturers to 
rebut a presumption of illegality.224  Notably, FTC data suggests that this 
rule will only affect a small minority of pharmaceutical settlements; nearly 
seventy-five percent of Hatch-Waxman Act infringement suits that settled 
from 2004 to 2009 (152 out of 218 final settlement agreements) did so 
without reverse payments.225 
In his dissenting opinion in Actavis, Chief Justice Roberts predicated 
his support for the scope of the patent test in part on the fact that judicial 
preference for settlement should be given the highest priority.226  The scope 
of the patent test is certainly much more pro-settlement than the quick look 
rule of reason analysis because it essentially declares reverse payment set-
tlements unreviewable.227  Indeed, in considering whether to find pay-for-
delay arrangements valid or invalid, many federal courts have given great 
weight to the economic advantages of settlement over expensive patent liti-
gation.228  Although encouraging cooperative settlement is certainly an im-
                                                          
 222.  See supra Part II.B.3.  
 223.  In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and 
judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013) (mem.).  
 224.  Id. at 218.   
 225.  AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC, supra note 199, at 2; PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 
77, at 4–5. 
 226.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 227.  See supra Part II.C.  
 228.  See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) (arguing that 
“[o]ur legal system can ill afford” to “undo much of the benefit of settling patent litigation, and 
discourage settlements”), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Erheart v. 
Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Settlement agreements are to be encouraged 
because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and lighten the increasing load of litiga-
tion faced by the federal courts.”); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072, 1075 
(11th Cir. 2005) (“The general policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the 
policy extends to the settlement of patent infringement suits. . . .  There is no question that settle-
ments provide a number of private and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly ef-
fects of litigation.”); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(citing the “longstanding” principle that “‘courts are bound to encourage’ the settlement of litiga-
tion”), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).   
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portant goal, it should not override the public policy objective of litigating 
patent challenges to “protect consumers from unjustified monopolies” or 
the maintenance of needlessly artificial anti-competitive drug prices.229 
The fact that one test would result in more settlements is insufficient to 
establish its cost-effective merits over the test that results in more litigation.  
This is because the pro-settlement test would, more often than not, result in 
an unnecessarily higher cost to consumers through inflated drug prices that 
come about as the result of brand-name manufacturers attempting to recoup 
their payment losses following pay-for-delay arrangements.230  The reality 
is many reverse payment settlements are collusive, horizontal restraints on 
trade,231 and judicial preference for settlement should not be the deciding 
factor in the debate about pay-for-delay standards.  The quick look rule of 
reason analysis takes into account the common sense understanding that an 
agreement wherein one company pays another company to delay entry into 
a particular market is a strong indication of anti-competitive intent.  The 
test, however, still provides manufacturers with the opportunity to defend 
themselves and ensures that settlement will remain the prevalent form of 
resolution in cases where delay is negotiated without compensation.232 
C.  The Court Should Have Recommended That Judicial Settlement 
Approval Be Required in Future Reverse Payment Cases 
While the quick look rule of reason analysis would provide the appro-
priate level of scrutiny for reverse payment settlements, using this standard 
to analyze settlements that have already occurred does not necessarily ad-
dress the ubiquity of such agreements, which have significant financial im-
plications for consumers.233  Even if pre-existing reverse payment settle-
ments are eventually challenged in court and deemed unlawful, the damage 
will have already been done.  Consumers will have had the excessive costs 
of settlement agreements pushed onto them in the form of higher prices and 
will have experienced delayed access to cheaper generic versions of their 
                                                          
 229.  In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217.  
 230. PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 8, 10; see also C. Scott Hemphill, Paying-for-Delay: 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 
1594 (2006) (“Saved litigation expense is thought to offset the allocative harm from the [reverse 
payment] settlement.  But although litigation expense is large in absolute terms, perhaps tens of 
millions of dollars, its size is dwarfed by the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars reallocated 
when parties enter a pay-for-delay settlement.”).   
 231.  See Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1572 (“The FTC’s concern [with pay-for-delay] is 
straightforward.  Privately optimal agreements that impose large negative effects upon nonparties 
frequently raise antitrust concerns.”); see supra Parts II.B.1–3.   
 232.  In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217. 
 233.  See Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1594 (noting that pay-for-delay results in consumers 
paying hundreds of millions of dollars in “reallocated” costs).  
SchipperFinalAuthorReview 5/6/2014  12:34 PM 
2014] FTC v. ACTAVIS, INC. 1271 
medications, costing the public even more.234  The goal, therefore, should 
be to curb these settlements by discincentivizing generic companies from 
settling when they know their patent does not infringe.  Additionally, brand-
names should be disincentivized from challenging generics’ patents when 
they knowingly hold a weak patent or know that their sought-after patent 
will not be infringed.  The most effective means of accomplishing this task 
lies in judicial approval of settlement amounts. 
Judicial settlement approval is a controversial solution that typically 
appears only in class action or Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) litiga-
tion contexts.235  Generally, courts favor settlement approval requirements 
in situations where parties are of unequal size or have vastly different levels 
of sophistication as a way to prevent knowledgeable parties from taking ad-
vantage of those that are ignorant.236  The situation in Actavis and other 
pay-for-delay cases is of course different from employment lawsuits—
generic and brand-name drug manufacturers are not of significantly differ-
ent means and posture, and both parties are aware of the consequences if a 
brand-name’s challenge to a generic’s ANDA goes to trial.  Yet, it is per-
haps this awareness that makes judicial approval of settlement so necessary.  
Because a generic manufacturer is cognizant of what its adversary stands to 
lose, it is encouraged to engage in risk-seeking behavior by filing an ANDA 
and is incentivized to settle if the offered price is on par with or higher than 
what the generic would gain upon market entry.237  Additionally, because 
the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA receives 180 days of exclu-
sivity under Hatch-Waxman, generics manufacturers are induced to speed 
up their testing processes and file abbreviated applications, even when they 
are not entirely certain that their ANDA patents would not infringe.238  This 
period of exclusivity and a successful challenge of a major drug patent can 
                                                          
 234.  See supra Parts I & II.A (explaining that the primary negative consequence of pay-for-
delay arrangements is that, in addition to consumers losing access to significantly cheaper medi-
cines for longer periods of time, to recoup the losses from their hefty settlement payouts, brand-
name drug manufacturers push their expenditures onto consumers in the form of higher drug pric-
es).  
 235.  See, e.g., Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that judicial settlement approval is necessary for lawful settlement of FLSA claims 
brought by then-current employees); Pollar v. Judson Steel Corp., No. C-82-6833-MHP, 1984 WL 
968 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1984) (holding that defendant in a class action suit was prohibited from 
proceeding with its settlement plan until further order of the court and court approval).  
 236.  See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 709–10 (1945) (expressing the 
importance of ensuring that the deterrent effect of a particular FLSA provision did not allow cor-
rupt employers to take advantage of an employee by settling FLSA claims privately for a paltry 
amount).   
 237.  Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1579.  
 238.  Id. at 1578–79.   
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provide generics with a “valuable bounty” of several hundred million dol-
lars.239 
Conversely, the pay-for-delay framework encourages brand-name 
manufacturers to be inherently risk-averse.  They stand to lose their mo-
nopoly on the market share of a particular drug if a generic prevails in its 
ANDA application.  It is therefore much more advantageous for them to 
settle patent litigation—including payment for a generic’s delayed entry in-
to the market—even if it comes at a high price.240  For instance, in their ar-
ticle quantifying the litigation risk calculations of both brand-name and ge-
neric drug manufacturers, Xiang Yu and Anjan Chatterji show that making 
reverse payment is a rational decision for a risk-averse brand-name manu-
facturer when there is high probability that a court will find its patent inva-
lid during paragraph IV litigation, which would result in loss of its drug 
monopoly.241  When the amount that a brand-name would lose is greater 
than the value of its projected litigation costs less the damages it could be 
awarded if the brand-name’s predictions are wrong and a court finds its pa-
tent valid, there is an ostensible logical basis for a brand-name’s incentive 
to settle, even at a high cost.242  Judges and juries are fallible, however, and 
neither brand-names nor generics can always accurately predict their find-
ings about patent validity over the course of litigation; thus, even when a 
brand-name is confident in its patent’s validity, it is willing to make reverse 
payment offers to secure patent monopolies because of their lucrative po-
tential.243  The uncertainty of litigation outcomes thereby encourages brand-
name companies to settle as long as there is even the slightest chance of los-
ing the patent at trial.244 
The brand-name manufacturer, secure in its patent monopoly, is often 
unable to feel the monetary loss resulting from its reverse payments because 
it can recoup its settlement payout by charging consumers higher prices for 
medicines.245  The FTC estimates that reverse payment settlements cost 
                                                          
 239.  See, e.g., Comment of Apotex Corp. in Support of Citizen Petition Docket No. 2004p-
0075/CP1, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA 4 (Mar. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/apr04/040204/04P-0075-emc00001.pdf (discussing 
generic manufacturer Apotex’s reported earnings of between $150 million and $200 million from 
the exclusivity period of its generic version of Paxil, an antidepressant).   
 240.  Xiang Yu & Anjan Chatterji, Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies Choose to Pay Ge-
nerics in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of the Asymmetric Risks in Litigation, 
10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 19, 29 (2011). 
 241.  Id. at 29–30. 
 242.  Id.  
 243.  Id. at 29.  
 244.  Id.; Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 283, 301 (2012).   
 245.  Cook, supra note 122, at 428; Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 244, at 301–03; Hemphill, 
supra note 230, at 1582.  
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consumers $3.5 billion annually, a figure that reflects both the costs pushed 
on consumers by brand-names trying to earn back settlement payments, and 
the higher prices that consumers pay for medicines because of delayed ac-
cess to generic products.246 
In contrast, a generic is only incentivized to continue in litigating its 
patent challenge when the brand-name is willing to pay significantly less 
than the generic would receive in profits after its drug enters the market.247  
Even when the generic is confident in its challenge and the non-
infringement of its ANDA, a brand-name’s high settlement offer is a defi-
nite win, as opposed to the mere prospect of profit from marketability that 
comes with continued litigation.248  Therefore, as antitrust scholar C. Scott 
Hemphill has noted,249 pay-for-delay arrangements are logical for both 
brand-name and generic manufacturers involved in paragraph IV litigation 
when the monetary incentive to settle is significantly greater than the 
amount that each thinks it would gain if litigation proceeded.250  Moreover, 
pay-for-delay arrangements become even more likely because of the “wide 
gap” that exists between a brand-name’s risk tolerance and a generic’s will-
ingness to litigate, given the economic payoff for each party that results 
from pay-for-delay.251 
In order to break out of the problematic and costly reverse payment 
settlement framework, both brand-names and generics must be induced to 
pursue litigation over settlement or enter settlement agreements that do not 
involve excessive compensation for market delay.  The most effective 
mechanism for accomplishing this goal is through required judicial settle-
ment approval, which would ensure that settlements exceeding litigation 
costs would not be permitted.  If a court finds that a brand-name has offered 
an excessive payment to delay a generic’s entry into a particular market, the 
court can bar the settlement, which would compel the parties to renegotiate 
their agreement.  In turn, generics would likely be encouraged to proceed 
with litigation when they are confident that their ANDA patent does not in-
fringe because the potential gains resulting from ANDA approval would be 
greater than the gains resulting from settlement.  Finally, brand-names 
would be discouraged from challenging generics’ ANDAs for patents that 
the brand-name knows is weak or where the brand-name knows that the ge-
neric’s patent would not infringe.  Brand-names would also be incentivized 
to develop drugs and secure airtight, valid patents to minimize the risk of 
                                                          
 246.  PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 2.  
 247.  Yu & Chatterji, supra note 240, at 24.   
 248.  Id.  
 249.  Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1594.  
 250.  Id. at 1591–92.  
 251.  Yu & Chatterji, supra note 240, at 34.  
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generic ANDA challenges alleging brand-name patent invalidity.  Settle-
ment approval would therefore continue to serve Hatch-Waxman’s goals of 
maintaining drug development and innovation while keeping drug prices 
low for consumers. 
The mechanism of judicial settlement approval is directly in line with 
legislative efforts to end the exorbitant pay-for-delay framework dating as 
far back as 2002, after the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Drug Com-
petition Act of 2001.252  The Drug Competition Act required all settlements 
between generic and brand-name manufacturers involving agreements over 
the “manufacture, marketing, or sale of the brand-name drug . . . [or] of the 
generic drug” to be disclosed to the FTC or the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice.253  More recently, however, members of Congress engaged in aggres-
sive attempts to enact stringent legislation to curb the pay-for-delay phe-
nomenon. 
In the 109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses, Senator Herb Kohl of Wis-
consin, along with several co-sponsors, supported the Preserve Access to 
Affordable Generics Act,254 which would make it illegal for any brand-
name and generic manufacturer to enter into an agreement where “(1) an 
ANDA filer [generic manufacturer] receives anything of value; and (2) the 
ANDA filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell 
the ANDA product for any period of time.”255  Kohl’s version of the bill in 
the 111th Congress was the only version to include two exceptions to the 
harsh rule.  First, any payments not exceeding $7.5 million, which are in-
tended to reimburse the generic ANDA filer for “reasonable litigation ex-
penses,” would be exempt from the bill.256  Second, the bill provided an op-
portunity for settling parties to rebut the presumption of the unlawful and 
anti-competitive nature of their settlement.257  In the House of Representa-
tives, Representative Henry Waxman—the very congressman for whom 
Hatch-Waxman is partially named—introduced a bill in the 110th Congress 
that would prohibit reverse payment settlements outright.258  While none of 
these bills have been passed, the unwavering legislative endeavors to ad-
dress reverse payment settlements demonstrate that the ubiquity of such set-
tlements is a serious problem that requires a preventative fix. 
                                                          
 252.  S. 754, 107th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 20, 2002).  
 253.  Id. § 5(2)(2). 
 254.  See S. 369, 111th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 3, 2009); S. 316, 110th Cong. (as 
introduced in Senate, Jan. 17, 2007); S. 3582, 109th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, June 27, 
2006).  
 255.  See, e.g., S. 316, 110th Cong. § 3.  
 256.  S. 369, 111th Cong. § 3.  
 257.  Id.  
 258.  H.R. 1432, 110th Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Waxman, Mar. 9, 2007).   
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Of course, patent litigation is not inexpensive, either.  In fact, because 
it is particularly complex, it is also particularly costly: typically, a patent 
case that proceeds to trial costs each side $1.5 million in legal fees alone.259  
One study found that the total cost of litigation in an ANDA challenge is 
approximately $10 million per suit.260  Therefore, if settlement approval led 
to increased litigation, the litigation costs incurred by brand-name and ge-
neric manufacturers could be publicly reflected in the form of increased 
drug prices in anticipation of litigation.  Furthermore, although seemingly 
counterintuitive, brand-names could potentially charge higher prices for 
drugs as a—seemingly counterintuitive—means of recouping losses sus-
tained upon generic market entry.261  In a 2007 working paper for the 
American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Stud-
ies, scholars Darius Lakdawalla, Tomas Philipson, and Richard Wang spec-
ulated that the increased costs and loss of market output that brand-names 
would face if pay-for-delay were abolished would create a short-term con-
sumer welfare loss of approximately $400,000 per month for each brand-
name drug facing generic entry.262 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV.B.2, the cost of litigation is not 
reason enough to forgo the policy of judicial settlement approval.  Pay-for-
delay creates an artificially inflated drug market wherein generic medica-
tions that should rightly be available to the public are delayed, forcing con-
sumers to pay higher drug prices so that brand-name manufacturers can 
make profits by engaging in collusive behavior.  The fundamental problem 
with the pay-for-delay arrangement is that it can represent an unnatural re-
straint on trade, which violates federal antitrust laws.  Thus, this potentially 
unlawful practice will only be curbed through a policy change that disincen-
tivizes both generic and brand-name manufacturers from entering into re-
verse payment settlements in the first place. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In deciding FTC v. Actavis, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented 
with a seminal opportunity to determine which of the competing standards 
being applied to pay-for-delay settlement arrangements in the various fed-
                                                          
 259.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlements of 
Intellectual Property Disputes 6 n.18 (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Research Paper No. 113, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstrat=380841. 
 260.  Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives 
for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1795 
n.41 (2011).   
 261.  Yu & Chatterji, supra note 240, at 35; Darius Lakdawalla, Tomas Philipson & Richard 
Wang, Intellectual Property and Marketing 20–24 (Reg. Markets Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-20, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089045. 
 262.  Lakdawalla, Philipson & Wang, supra note 261, at 2–3. 
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eral courts was the correct approach.263  While the Court rightly held that 
antitrust laws are indeed applicable to pay-for-delay arrangements,264 the 
Court’s avoidance of the issue at the crux of the case—that is, which stand-
ard should ultimately be used in adjudicating pay-for-delay settlement pro-
visions—did not adequately address the fundamental problem of pay-for-
delay that plagues federal courts, the FTC, and purchasers of pharmaceuti-
cals alleging antitrust injury. 265  The Court should have annunciated the 
Third Circuit’s quick look rule of reason analysis as the standard for courts 
to use in the future, as this test most effectively balances the need for anti-
trust scrutiny of settlements appearing to be prima facie restraints on trade, 
with the need to continue encouraging both generic and brand-name drug 
manufacturers to develop new medicines.266  Finally, the Court should have 
recommended, as a policy consideration, that judicial settlement approval 
be required for reverse payment settlement litigation going forward.267  This 
policy would serve to disincentivize generics and brand-names from enter-
ing into exorbitant settlements that vastly exceed litigation costs, encourage 
generics to pursue ANDA litigation when they know a brand-name’s patent 
is weak or theirs would not infringe, and encourage brand-names to fight 
for their right to a patent when they know that infringement would be im-
minent with the generic’s ANDA approval. 
 
 
                                                          
 263.  See supra Part I.  
 264.  See supra Part IV.A.  
 265.  See supra Part IV.A.  
 266.  See supra Part IV.B.  
 267.  See supra Part IV.C.  
